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The federal government has long assumed a legal obligation to
provide education to the Indian tribes. The government's initial edu-
cation policy developed as an integral part of its more general policy
of "civilizing" the American Indian. However, federal policies over
the past sixty-five years have placed an increasing emphasis on Indian
self-governance.3 Consequently, responsibility for the day-to-day op-
eration of Indian education has shifted from federal agencies to tribal
governments which operate with funds provided by the Department
of the Interior and the Department of Education.5 Today, there are
over one hundred tribally controlled schools nationwide.
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I See, for example, Vince Deloria, Legislative Analysis of the Federal Role in Indian Edu-
cation 1-37 (Office of Indian Education 1975) (examining the chronology of the federal govern-
ment's relationship to the Indians, including obligations to provide education undertaken
through treaties and statutes); id at 39-71 (examining the federal government's legal obligations
to Indian tribes in the field of education as embodied in various treaties).
2 See Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 177 (Michie 1982) ("As in earlier
eras, education was used as an important device for moving Indians into the mainstream of
American society.") (citation omitted). See also Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802, ch 13, § 13, 2
Stat 139,143 (authorizing the President to expend funds "in order to promote civilization among
the friendly Indian tribes"); Act of March 3, 1819, ch 85, § 2, 3 Stat 516, 516-17 (establishing a
permanent annual appropriation to introduce the tribes to "the habits and arts of civilization").
3 See, for example, Indian Reorganization Act, Pub L No 73-383,48 Stat 984 (1934), codi-
fied at 25 USC §§ 461 et seq (1994) ("Wheeler-Howard Act") (providing a basis for formalizing
tribal self-government and clarifying the powers of reservation governments).
4 See Cohen, Handbook at 192-95 (cited in note 2) (describing the shift in control over
Indian education from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to Indian parents and tribal authorities).
5 See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub L No 93-638,
88 Stat 2203, codified at 25 USC §§ 450 et seq (1994) (authorizing federal grants to tribes for the
specific purpose of improving tribal governments and permitting tribes to contract to perform
services formerly provided by the federal government); Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 1988,
Pub L No 100-297,102 Stat 385, codified at 25 USC §§ 2501 et seq (1994), amended by Pub L No
107-110,115 Stat 1425 (Jan 8,2002) (authorizing Indian tribes to contract to receive federal fund-
ing for the operation of tribal schools).
6 See Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Indian Education Programs, Director's Page,
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Although Congress authorized these schools to promote tribal
self-governance, the recognition of tribal governments has not altered
the rights guaranteed by treaty nor diminished the United States's le-
gal responsibility to provide educational services to Indians.! Con-
gress's recognition of tribal governments as providers of educational
services is consistent with its historic practice of delegating responsi-
bility for the provision of Indian services to various governmental and
private organizations,9 but the federal government retains a general
legal obligation to serve Indian tribes even if it has delegated some
power to other agencies. '°
In this context, there is a tension created when Congress estab-
lishes limitations on tribal education. Although the law protects the
tribes' interest in self-governance, federal laws related to education-
and civil rights laws, in particular-may cut against that very interest.
This Comment will explore the conflict of interests by focusing on one
civil rights statute: Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any federally
funded program or activity."
The examination of Title IX and its applicability to Indian tribes
calls into question the ways in which the federal government should
balance its own interests and obligations with the tribes' interest in
self-governance. Even as tribes gain greater control of education, the
federal government may wish to limit financial support to tribal
schools when such support implicitly endorses policies that contra-
vene Congress's expressed will with regards to education and civil
rights. Drawing on the principles underlying tribal self-government
available online at <http://www.oiep.bia.edu/director's-page.htm> (visited Mar 15,2002) ("Since
1995, there have been more schools operated by tribes through grants and contracts than oper-
ated by the BIA. In school year ... 1995, 98 of the 187 [Indian] schools were tribally controlled
schools. Since 1995, the number of tribally controlled schools has increased to 120.").
7 See generally Robert A. Roessel, Jr., An Overview of the Rough Rock Demonstration
School, 7 J Am Indian Educ 2, 13-14 (1968) (arguing that the development of tribally controlled
schools was essential to the Indians' quest for self-determination).
8 See Deloria, Legislative Analysis at 121 (cited in note 1) ("Recognition of federal tribal
governments as sponsoring agencies has in no way altered the rights derived under treaty or
changed the general assumption of services for Indians by the United States.").
9 See id at 100 (noting that Congress allocated responsibility for Indian programs to vari-
ous governmental departments).
10 See id at 73 (noting "[t]wo fundamental facts" that emerge in discussions of the United
States's legal responsibility for the education of Indians: (1) Congress may designate "to any de-
partment or agency, governmental or private," powers and duties to perform services for Indians;
and (2) when Congress assigns such a duty "to a state, a private organization, or a tribal or inter-
tribal organization, the legal responsibility of the United States follows the assignment of du-
ties").
11 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-318,86 Stat 235,373, codi-
fied at 20 USC §§ 1681 et seq (1994).
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and sex equality, this Comment argues that federally funded tribal
schools should .comply with Title IX requirements.
Parts I and II of this Comment introduce the relevant back-
ground law: Part I examines the history and application of Title IX;
Part II discusses the law related to Indian self-governance. Part III ar-
gues that tribal schools should be subject to suit for Title IX violations
for three reasons. First, Congress intended Title IX to apply to tribal
schools. Second, tribal schools cannot claim immunity from suit under
Title IX because the tribes waived their immunity by signing assur-
ance letters in which they accepted federal funds. Finally, additional
policy reasons, related to general civil rights law and notions of equal-
ity contained therein, support this conclusion.
I. THrLE IX
A. Legal History
Concerned that "prejudices and outmoded customs act as barri-
ers to the full realization of women's basic rights"' 2 and desiring to as-
sure women "the opportunity to develop their capacities and fulfill
their aspirations on a continuing basis,"" President John F. Kennedy
established the President's Commission on the Status of Women in
1963. The Commission assessed the social and economic position of
women in American society and proposed recommendations for fed-
eral action in the areas of employment, education, home and commu-
nity services, insurance and taxes, and legal treatment with respect to
civil and political rights. The Commission found that discrimination
against women was both pervasive and detrimental to the realization
of opportunities for women." Consequently, the Commission issued a
comprehensive report proposing expansive changes in the social and
economic structure of American society in order to facilitate women's
integration into the workforce and to "encourage women to make
their full contribution as citizens.
'
"6
One of the many responses to the Commission's findings and
proposals was the enactment of Title IX., 7 The language of the intro-
duction to Title IX, which provides, "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education




15 See, for example, Report of the U.S President's Commission on the Status of Women 16-
95 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1965).
16 See id at 16.
17 20 USC § 1681 (1994).
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program or activity receiving federal financial assistance,"' ,; is modeled
on the prohibitions against race and national origin discrimination
contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 Although Title
IX was originally proposed as an amendment to Title VI that would
have added the word "sex" to its prohibited forms of discrimination,'"
the prevalence of discrimination in education resulted in a bill specifi-
cally aimed at educational programs.2' Specifically, Title IX conditions
an offer of federal funding to educational institutions on the recipi-
ent's promise not to discriminate.2 As such, it essentially amounts to a
contract between the government and a recipient of federal funds: M an
exchange of money for a guarantee of non-discrimination in any fed-
erally funded educational activity. Title IX is enforceable by private
parties through an implied right of action.4
B. Interpretation and Enforcement
The strength of the enforcement mechanisms available pursuant
to Title IX, as interpreted by courts and enhanced by subsequent con-
gressional action, demonstrates the forcefulness of the policies under-
lying the statute: schools must provide an environment free from sex-
ual harassment or discrimination on the basis of sex. In the early
1980s, courts divided over whether Title IX covered only those pro-
18 Id.
19 Pub L No 8-352,78 Stat 252,42 USC § 2000(d) (1994) ("No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of; or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
assistance.").
20 See Ellen J. Vargyas, Breaking Down Barriers: A Legal Guide to Title IX 7 (National
Women's Law Center 1994) ("As initially conceived, Title IX would have simply added the word
,sex' to the broad prohibition against race and national origin discrimination of all types by re-
cipients of federal funds in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
21 See id (noting that because "sex discrimination in education was the primary focus of
hearings" on gender discrimination, "a provision more narrowly tailored to address sex discrimi-
nation in education" was enacted as Title IX). For a detailed description of the legislative history
of Title IX, including an account of the proposed goals and remedies sought to be achieved by
the bill's drafters, see Deborah Brake and Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The
Long Road toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 Duke J Gender L & Pol 51,53 &
n 7 (1996) (noting that "hearings on sex discrimination in the summer of 1970 ... serve[d] as the
foundation of the Title IX legislation").
22 See 20 USC § 1682 (1994) (authorizing federal agencies in charge of distributing federal
funds to educational institutions to issue rules and regulations applicable to recipient institutions
consistent with the objectives of Title IX).
23 This analogy has also been used to describe Title VI, which served as the model for Title
IX. See Guardians Association v Civil Service Commission of City of New York, 463 US 582,599
(1983) (noting that "Congress intended Title VI to be a typical 'contractual' spending-power pro-
vision").
24 See Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677,688-89 (1979) (holding that while per-
sonal harm resulting from violation of a federal law does not automatically give rise to a private
cause of action under that law, a review of the four "Cort factors" implies a right of action under
Title IX).
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grams directly receiving federal funds within an institution, or the en-
tire institution.n Although the Supreme Court initially adopted the
narrower interpretation," Congress ultimately embraced a broader
reading by passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. The Act
made clear that an entire institution is covered by Title IX if any of its
programs or activities is a recipient of federal funds: Congress in-
cluded specific findings indicating that the Act was intended to correct
the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court and to restore "an in-
stitution-wide application" of Title IX.2 "
The Supreme Court further strengthened Title IX when it armed
plaintiffs with the right to seek money damages for an intentional vio-
lation of the statute in Franklin v Gwinett County Public Schools.2
Giving plaintiffs access to individual relief made their claims justicia-
ble post-graduation, and the threat of schools having to pay out large
damage awards operated as a powerful incentive for them to bring
their athletic programs, as well as other educational programs, into
compliance with Title IX. Thus, Franklin represented a major step
forward in Title IX enforcement: By providing the right to seek money
damages, the case underscores the fact that ensuring a viable private
right of action is essential to protecting and promoting the goals un-
derlying Title IX.
II. TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: THE APPLICATION OF GENERALLY
APPLICABLE LAWS AND THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN
TRIBAL IMMUNITY
Although the policies and application of Title IX are well estab-
lished, two significant barriers block its application to tribal schools.
25 Compare Rice v Harvard College, 663 F2d 336,338-39 (ist Cir 1981) (refusing to apply
Title IX without a claim that sex discrimination occurred in specific educational program receiv-
ing federal funds), and University of Richmond v Bell, 543 F Supp 321,333 (E D Va 1982) (hold-
ing that the Department of Education could not regulate an athletic department under Title IX,
where that department received no federal funds), with Haffer v Temple University, 688 F2d 14,
16 (3d Cir 1982) (holding that an athletic department was subject to Title IX when the university
as a whole received federal funds).
26 'See Grove City College v Bell, 465 US 555,572 (1984) (holding that Title IX applied only
to a "program or activity" that actually received federal funds).
Z7 Pub L No 100-259,102 Stat 28, codified at 20 USC § 1687 (1994), amended by Pub L No
107-110, 115 Stat 1425 (Jan 8, 2002) (broadening Title IX's definition of "program or activity" to
include "all of the operations of [an institution] ... any part of which is extended federal financial
assistance").
28 See Brake and Catlin, 3 Duke J Gender L & Pol at 59 n 52 (cited in note 21) (noting that
Congress found that "certain aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court
have unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application of Title IX" and that "legislative
action is necessary to restore the prior consistent and long-standing executive branch interpreta-
tion"), quoting Civil Rights Restoration Act, 102 Stat at 636.
29 503 US 60,76 (1992) (holding that a damages remedy is available for an action brought
to enforce Title IX).
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First, notions of tribal self-governance suggest difficulties in determin-
ing when Congress intended generally applicable laws, such as Title
IX, to apply to tribes. Second, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immu-
nity, with some exceptions, protects tribes from suit in a nontribal fo-
rum.
Because neither the Constitution nor any statute clearly deline-
ates the contours of tribal sovereign immunity, analysis of tribal sover-
eign immunity requires careful reasoning from fundamental principles
of federal Indian law and policy. The principle of tribal sovereignty
means that Indian tribes are treated as domestic dependent nations
that retain limited powers of sovereignty." This sovereignty is limited
insofar as it is subject to "the superior and plenary control of Con-
gress."3' This has two important consequences, which are examined in
more detail below. First, there is reason to scrutinize congressional in-
tent to determine if a generally applicable law applies to tribes. Sec-
ond, as sovereign entities, tribes are immune from suit in federal and
state courts only if immunity is not waived by Congress or the tribes
themselves.32
A. Generally Applicable Laws
1. Silent statutes and the Farris tripartite test
When a law specifically mentions Indian tribes, a court can de-
termine from the language of the law whether Congress intended it to
apply to Indians. However, more difficult interpretive questions arise
when the statute itself is generally applicable, yet the law in question is
silent as to Indian tribes. The Supreme Court has indicated, in dictum,
"that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indi-
ans and their property interests."33 Some lower courts have indicated
that they would, in limited circumstances, follow this dictum to inter-
pret congressional silence as an intent to waive tribal immunity.4
30 See, for example, William C. Canby, American Indian Law in a Nutshell 72-87 (West
1998).
31 Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49,58 (1978).
32 See id at 58-59.
33 FPC v Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 US 99,116 (1960).
34 See, for example, Donovan v Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir
1985) (asking "whether congressional silence should be taken as an expression of intent to ex-
clude tribal enterprises from the scope of [a generally applicable] Act to which they would oth-
erwise be subject" and concluding that it should not); Navajo Tribe v National Labor Relations
Board, 288 F2d 162, 165 n 4 (DC Cir 1961) (stating that general statutes, including the NLRA,
cover Indians and their property interests). See also Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal
Laws of General Application to Indian Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 UC Davis L Rev 85,
88-89 (1991) (criticizing the Coeur d'Alene decision for interfering with tribal sovereignty "be-
cause at least in some cases, it will allow a law to be enforced on Indian reservations when Con-
gress is silent regarding its intent to interfere").
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In United States v Farris, ' the Ninth Circuit proposed a test to de-
termine whether a general statute, silent as to Indian tribes, does in
fact apply to Indian tribes?' The court held that a generally applicable
statute presumptively applies to Indians unless: (1) the law touches
"exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters;" (2)
the application of the law to the tribe would "abrogate rights guaran-
teed by Indian treaties;" or (3) there is proof "by legislative history or
some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to
Indians on their reservations." In the absence of any controlling Su-
preme Court decisions in nontreaty cases, a majority of courts today
follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit in Farris.3 Taken together, these
circuit court decisions make it clear that Congress can, in limited cir-
cumstances, divest a tribe's sovereign powers through a generally ap-
plicable statute that is silent as to its application to Indian tribes.
2. Refining the Farris test: when do the exceptions apply?
In Farris, the court concluded, without much discussion, that the
self-governance exception did not apply to the case then before it. The
court simply said that the issue presented-which involved a restau-
rant operated in conjunction with a gaming facility on the Puyallup
Indian Reservation-was "neither profoundly intramural ... nor es-
sential to self-government."' In defining "purely intramural," the
court noted that intramural matters generally consist of conditions of
tribal membership, domestic relations and inheritance rules. It then
held that the operation of gambling facilities was not purely intramu-
ral for purposes of the test because the restaurant was a gaming facil-
ity open to non-Indians; because the gaming facilities did not relate to
the governmental functions of the tribe; and because the gaming facil-
ity did not operate exclusively within the domain of the tribe or its
members. 2
35 624F2d 890 (9thCir 1980).
36 Id at 893-94.
37 Id.
38 See Florida Paraplegic Association v Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 166 F3d
1126,1129-30 (11th Cir 1999) (adopting the Farris test); Reich v Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95
F3d 174, 182 (2d Cir 1996) (same); United States v Funmaker, 10 F3d 1327, 1331 (7th Cir 1993)
(same); Nero v Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F2d 1457,1462-63 (10th Cir 1989) (same).
39 See, for example, Florida Paraplegic Assn, 166 F3d at 1129-30 (concluding that the
Americans with Disabilities Act applies to Indian tribes); Reich, 95 F3d at 177-82 (holding that
the Occupational Safety and Health Act applies to an Indian tribe); Smart v State Farm Insur-
ance Co, 868 F2d 929, 932-36 (7th Cir 1989) (applying ERISA to an employee's benefit plan es-
tablished and operated by an Indian tribe); Coeur d'Alene, 751 F2d at 1116 (holding that OSHA
applies to a tribe's commercial activities).
40 Farris, 624 F2d at 893.
41 Id.
42 Id. Compare EEOC v Karuk Tribe Housing Authority, 260 F3d 1071, 1080-81 (9th Cir
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The Ninth Circuit followed this precedent and further refined its
approach five years later in Donovan v Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm. 
4
Coeur d'Alene considered whether the Occupational Safety and
Health Act ("OSHA') applied to the Coeur d'Alene Farm, a com-
mercial enterprise wholly owned and operated by the Coeur D'Alene
Indian Tribe.5 OSHA is a comprehensive law designed to "assure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions."'
Employing the approach developed in Farris, the Coeur d'Alene
court found that this language was sufficiently general to meet the
presumption that it applied to Indian tribes and, moreover, that none
of the exceptions to the general rule applied to the case then before
it. 7 The court also refined the Farris test by emphasizing that the tribal
self-government exception applied only where the statute would af-
fect "purely intramural matters." Further defining the meaning of the
term "purely intramural," the court embraced the idea that the exis-
tence or involvement of a non-Indian person or interest can transform
the issue into a nonintramural issue.
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Although a court may determine that a law applies to Indian
tribes, those tribes are not necessarily subject to suit under that law.
The question of applicability of a statute to tribes is separate from that
of immunity from suit. This subpart specifically addresses the question
of a tribe's immunity from suit.
If an Indian tribe raises sovereign immunity as a defense to a suit
against it, a federal or state court may be barred from hearing the ac-
2001) (holding that the Age Discrimination Employment Act, a general statute silent as to In-
dian tribes, is not applicable to an Indian tribe in its relationship to its employee because the
tribe was acting as a provider of a governmental service to its members and, moreover, the dis-
pute arose between the tribal government and a member of its own tribe and was thus a "purely
internal matter").
43 751 F2d 1113 (9th Cir 1985).
44 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub L 91-596, 84 Stat 1590, codified at 29
USC §§ 651 et seq (1994).
45 Coeur d'Alene, 751 F2d at 1114.
46 Id at 1115, quoting 29 USC § 651(b).
47 751F2d at 1116.
48 Id.
49 Id, quoting Farris, 624 F2d at 893:
The operation of a farm that sells produce on the open market and in interstate commerce
is not an aspect of tribal self-government. Because the Farm employs non-Indians as well as
Indians, and because it is in virtually every respect a normal farming enterprise, we believe
that its operation free of federal health and safety regulations is "neither profoundly intra-
mural ... nor essential to self-government".
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tion, absent congressional authorization through treaty or statute.s In
such a case, tribal sovereign immunity would foreclose subject matter
jurisdiction,5' and the merits of a suit against the tribe could not be
heard. The doctrine covers both the tribe and tribal entities,2 but most
courts draw a distinction between tribal affairs relating to governmen-
tal matters, which are afforded protection under the doctrine, and
tribal affairs related to commercial dealings, which are not protected."
The doctrine does not insulate tribal officers or agents from liability to
plaintiffs, ' unless Congress intends for tribal officers to enjoy immu-
nity where such immunity would operate to protect the tribal gov-
ernment from a level of scrutiny inconsistent with the notion of self-55
governance.
Courts recognize two significant exceptions to tribal sovereign
immunity. First, Congress has plenary control of tribal immunity, and it
may modify or dispense with the doctrine entirely.5 Second, Indian
tribes may waive their immunity without explicit congressional au-
thority.n When looking at tribal waivers, courts examine whether the
50 See, for example, United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 323-24 (1978) (holding that In-
dian tribes retain those elements of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or Congress); Worcester
v Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 560-61 (1832) (holding that the Cherokee Nation is a "distinct
community" in which actions must be taken "with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress").
51 Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49,58 (1979).
52 See Hagen v Sisseton-Wahpeton Community College, 205 F3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir 2000)
(holding that a community college operated by an Indian tribe is an "arm of the tribe" and there-
fore entitled to sovereign immunity).
53 See, for example, Donovan v Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir
1985) (holding that the OSHA applied to a tribe's farm as a commercial enterprise). See also
Roberson v Confederated Tribes, 1980 US Dist LEXIS 9991, *8,11 (D Or) (holding that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity barred suit against the Confederated Tribes, but that its corporation
may be an "employer" under the Labor Management Relations Act and therefore subject to
suit).
54 See, for example, Oklahoma Tax Commission v Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma, 498 US 505,514 (1991) (holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred suit
by a state against an Indian tribe but that individual agents or officers of the tribe might none-
theless be liable for damages in a suit by the state).
55 Martinez, 436 US at 59-60,71 (noting that while an officer of a tribe is not protected by
the tribe's immunity from suit, the court must bear in mind that providing a federal forum for
such a suit might "constitute[ ] an interference with tribal autonomy and self-government," and
thus declining to "expos[e] tribal officials to the full array of federal remedies available").
56 See Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 US at 510 (holding that Congress is "at liberty to dis-
pense with ... tribal immunity or to limit it"); Martinez, 436 US at 58 (noting that "[t]his aspect
of tribal sovereignty ... is subject to the superior and plenary control of Congress"). See also
Scott D. Danahy, Comment, License to Discriminate: The Application of Sovereign Immunity to
Employment Discrimination Claims Brought by Non-Native American Employees of Tribally
Owned Businesses, 25 Fla St U L Rev 679, 683--84 (1998) ("The ... widely accepted theory ... is
that by nature of their conquest by the Europeans and later the United States, [the Indians'] sov-
ereignty no longer inherently exists but is permitted by the government. Under this theory, the
federal government has the ability to abrogate tribal immunity as it wishes.").
57 See Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation Tribal Credit v White, 139 F3d 1268,
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tribal entity had authority to waive immunity;u and courts generally
hold that tribal waivers must be explicit and should be strictly con-
strued. 9 Despite these rigorous standards, courts have recognized
tribal waivers through involvement in bankruptcy proceedings;o arbi-
tration clauses in contracts;6' and "sue or be sued" clauses in tribal
constitutions,62 corporate charters,6' and ordinances creating subsidiary
tribal entities, such as a housing authority.6'
Recognizing waiver of tribal immunity is a natural extension of
the principles of tribal self-governance. Several statutes promote self-
determination by recognizing tribes as basic governmental entities ca-
pable of providing essential services and making decisions regarding
the well-being of their constituents.6 That tribes can waive their immu-
nity in state or federal courts is an extension of this rationale.6
1271 (9th Cir 1998) ("Indian tribes may consent to suit without explicit congressional author-
ity.").
58 See, for example, Namekagon Development Company v Bois Forte Reservation Housing
Authority, 517 F2d 508,509-10 (8th Cir 1975) (examining a tribal ordinance creating a subsidiary
housing authority to determine if the housing authority did, in fact, possess the authority to
waive tribal sovereign immunity for the issue at hand).
59 See Martinez, 436 US at 59 (holding that waivers of tribal sovereign immunity must be
"unequivocally expressed"). But see Ninigret Development Corp v Narrangansett Indian We-
tuomuck Housing Authority, 207 F3d 21, 30 (1st Cir 2000) (advocating a flexible, case-by-case
approach to interpreting waiver).
60 See, for example, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 19 F3d at 1269, 1271
(holding that the tribe waived its immunity with respect to claim against a debtor when it par-
ticipated in Chapter 11 proceedings).
61 See, for example, C & L Enterprises, Inc v Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Ok-
lahoma, 532 US 411, 417-20 (2001) (holding that provisions in a construction contract for the
installation of a roof on a tribally owned building located off-reservation, providing for applica-
tion of Oklahoma law, binding arbitration of disputes, and enforcement of arbitration decisions
in any state or federal court with jurisdiction constituted a clear waiver of the tribe's sovereign
immunity against suit). See also Sokagoan Gaming Enterprise Corp v Tushie-Montgomery Asso-
ciates, Inc, 86 F3d 656, 659-60 (7th Cir 1996) (holding that where an arbitration clause contains
specified arbitral and judicial fora for enforcement of the rights under the contract, the clause
does not have to refer to a waiver of sovereign immunity to constitute an explicit waiver).
62 See, for example, Fontenelle v Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, 430 F2d 143, 147 (8th Cir 1970)
(holding that the Omaha Tribe "rendered itself amenable to a quiet title action" through the in-
clusion of a general "sue or be sued" clause in tribal constitution).
63 See, for example, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v A & P Steel, Inc, 874 F2d 550,552 (8th Cir 1989)
(finding waiver by virtue of a provision allowing the tribe "to sue or be sued" found in the tribe's
corporate charter).
64 See, for example, Weeks Construction, Inc v Oglala Sioux Housing Authority, 797 F2d
668,671 (8th Cir 1986) (finding that the "sue and be sued" clause in a tribal ordinance creating a
housing authority constituted a waiver of that authority's immunity to suit).
65 See, for example, Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 ("IS-
DEA"), Pub L No 93-638, 88 Stat 2203, codified at 25 USC §§ 450a-450n (1994). The ISDEA
encourages meaningful tribal sovereignty through "effective ... participation by the Indian peo-
ple in the planning, conduct, and administration of [federal] programs and services." Id at
§ 450a(b). The ISDEA allows the Secretary of the Interior to contract with tribal organizations
to administer service and benefit programs previously administered by the Secretary. Id at § 450L
The Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub L No 90-284,104 Stat 1892 (1990), codified at 25 USC §§ 1301-
41 (1994), validates tribal powers by placing tribes in a position of responsibility and accountabil-
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III. TITLE IX AND THE TRIBAL SCHOOLS
Having laid out the foundations of Title IX and the tribal sover-
eign immunity doctrine, this Comment will argue that Title IX should
apply to tribal schools and that tribal schools are subject to Title IX
suits because they have waived immunity. This Part will show that, un-
der the tripartite Farris test, Title IX applies to Indian tribal schools. It
will then argue that tribal schools waived their sovereign immunity by
signing assurance letters. Finally, it will show that the strength of the
federal interest in Title IX should allow the federal government to in-
tervene in tribal affairs in this limited context.
A. The Application of Title IX to Tribal Schools
As discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court has not indicated
whether a generally applicable statute, such as Title IX, applies to In-
dian tribes, absent explicit language including tribes under the stat-
ute." However, the absence of congressional intent in the language of
Title IX with respect to Indian and tribal rights is not necessarily de-
terminative of this dispute. In fact, the Ninth Circuit's presumption in
Farris-that general statutes whose concerns are widely inclusive and
do not affect traditional Indian or tribal rights are typically applied to
Indians-governs the analysis of the question presented here." Thus,
unless one of the Farris exceptions applies, courts should infer an in-
tent to apply Title IX to Indian tribes. The Farris exceptions are three-
fold. A law will not apply to Indian tribes if it infringes either upon
their right to self-governance, or upon rights guaranteed to them
through treaties.6 9 The application of these exceptions in the context of
Indian tribal schools will be discussed in subsections 1 and 2 below.
The third exception-that explicit legislative language may exempt
Indians from a law-is clearly absent in Title IX and need not be dis-
cussed. 7
ity similar to that of the federal, state, and local governments. See Cohen, Handbook at 204
(cited in note 2).
66 See, for example, United States v Oregon, 657 F2d 1009,1014 (9th Cir 1981) (noting that
the Yakima Tribe possesses certain powers of self-determination and that "[t]o hold that the abil-
ity to waive immunity is not among these powers would be contrary to that right"); Merrion v Ji-
carilla Apache Tribe, 617 F2d 537, 540 (10th Cir 1980) (en banc) (concluding that a tribal ordi-
nance in which the tribe consented to suit to determine the legal validity of a tax constituted a
waiver of that tribe's immunity with respect to litigation involving the tax); Fontenelle, 430 F2d at
147 ("By adopting a provision in\its Corporate Charter consenting to sue and be sued, the
-Omaha Tribe has rendered itself ameable to a quiet title action.").
67 See Part II.A.
63 See Coeur d'Algne, 751 F2d at 1115 (noting that generally applicable laws have never
been interpreted to exclude Indians).
69 Farris, 624 F2d at 893-94.
70 20 USC § 1681 (1994).
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1. Applying Farris to tribal schools: is education a matter of self-
governance that is purely intramural?
Under Farris, the first question is whether Title IX's application
would infringe upon a tribe's right to self-governance.7 While tribal
schools are, by definition, operated by a tribal entity, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the operation of the school falls within the definition
of self-governance as set out by Farris and subsequent cases.n Al-
though Title IX may interfere with some aspects of the tribe's ability
to develop a curriculum or to allocate its expenditures, it does not
completely usurp the tribe's decisionmaking regarding tribal schools.
Title IX does not dictate what the tribes must do in terms of educa-
tion; it merely says that when tribes act, they must ensure that women
and men receive the benefits of that action on an equivalent basis. 7
It is still unclear whether legislation comes within the "self-
governance" exception if it affects some, but not all, of the tribe's deci-
sionmaking power.7 What is clear, however, is that the question is not
whether the statute affects tribal self-governance in general, but,
rather, whether it affects tribal self-governance in purely intramural
matters. The determinative question, then, is whether education is a
purely intramural matter.
Although courts have not addressed this issue, a two-part defini-
tion of "purely intramural" has emerged through the common law ap-
plication of the Farris test. 5 If the legislation affects conditions of
membership, rules of inheritance or domestic relations, it is purely in-
71tramural. If, however, the regulated activity affects individuals out-
71 See Farris, 624 F2d at 893.
72 See, for example, Reich v Mashantucket Sand and Gravel, 95 F3d 174, 180 (2d Cir 1996)
("That an entity is owned by a tribe, operates as an arm of a tribe, or takes direction from a tribal
council, does not ipso facto elevate it to the status of a tribal government.").
73 See 20 USC § 1681.
74 Compare Lumber Industry Pension Fund v Warm Springs Forest Products Industries, 939
F2d 683, 685 (9th Cir 1991) (determining that the tribe's decisionmaking power was not usurped
by applying ERISA because "[t]he tribe was free to form and operate a tribal pension plan, and
the mill was free to transfer its employees to that plan at the end of the collective bargaining
agreement term." Absent total usurpation of the tribe's decisionmaking power, the statute did
not infringe upon the tribe's right to self-governance.), with Martin v Great Lakes Indian Fish
and Wildlife Commission, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 15883, *22 (D Wis) (concluding that the Fair La-
bor Standards Act would have a direct effect on self-governance because it would require the
tribe to take into consideration the Act's restrictions on overtime and requirements for overtime
pay, and "no one can dispute that governmental restrictions on wages to be paid and hours to be
worked are a direct interference with an employer's ability to schedule its workers and allocate
its expenditures").
75 See notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
76 See note 49. See also Nero v Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F2d 1457, 1462-63 (10th
Cir 1989) (concluding that certain generally applicable civil rights statutes did not allow plaintiffs
to bring a claim alleging that the tribe's denial of a right to vote infringed their civil rights be-
cause voting is a matter that "would affect the Tribe's right to self-governance in a purely inter-
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side the tribe, or an activity that impacts interstate commerce or an-
other important federal interest,7 it is not purely intramural.
Legislation regulating education affects the tribe's right to define
itself culturally and politically,7 and is thus intimately related to a
tribe's internal affairs.s Education, however, is not purely intramural
because tribal schools do not serve only members from one tribe. ' Al-
though no court has yet determined how to classify decisions affecting
nontribal members, courts have held that the principle of self-
determination that permits tribes to make substantive decisions
affecting their own members does not extend to decisions affecting
non-Indian members.2
It is likely that a court's decisions regarding non-Indians will ex-
tend to cover the case of nontribal members in the education context:
the reasons justifying the court's conclusions when non-Indians are
implicated by a tribe's actions also apply to educational activities in-
volving members from different tribes. That is, the tribe's regulation of
members of other tribes is an exercise of power beyond what is neces-
sary to regulate its own membership, conditions of inheritance, or do-
mestic relations.n
nal matter" and thus the statutes did not apply to the tribe).
77 See Florida Paraplegic Association v Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 166 F3d
1126,1129 (11th Cir 1999) ("Tribe-run business enterprises acting in interstate commerce do not
fall under the 'self-governance' exception to the rule that general statutes apply to Indian
tribes."). See also United States v Funmaker, 10 F3d 1327, 1331-32 (7th Cir 1993) (determining
that a federal statute regulating damage to property allowed a district court to assert jurisdiction
over an Indian accused of setting fire to an Indian gambling casino because "a bingo hall and ca-
sino designed to attract tourists from surrounding states undeniably affects interstate commerce
for Commerce Clause purposes").
78 See Funmaker, 10 F3d at 1331-32 ("The decision-making power of Indian tribes ends...
when those decisions violate federal law designed to safeguard important federal interests").
79 Advocates of tribal education have long argued that the right to control the education of
Indians is intimately related to the ability to define a concept of citizenship for tribal members
that recognizes Indian culture and tradition. See David Adams, A Case Study: Self-Determination
and Indian Education, 13 J Am Indian Educ 21,22-23 (Jan 1974) (arguing that education should
reflect the principles of self-determination by focusing on native culture and language).
80 See Nero, 892 F2d at 1463 ("Applying the statutory prohibitions against race discrimina-
tion to a tribe's designation of tribal members would in effect eviscerate the tribe's sovereign
power to define itself, and thus would constitute an unacceptable interference 'with a tribe's abil-
ity to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity."'), quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v
Martinez, 436 US 49,72 (1979).
81 See, for example, National Centers of Excellence (NCE): Tribal College Partnership Pro-
ject, available online at <http'J/www.ezec.gov/News/NCE/ucet3.html> (visited Mar 25,2002) (list-
ing three tribal colleges and the several tribes each college serves); National Centers of Excel-
lence: Tribal College Partnership Project: Tribal Colleges <http'J/www.rurdev.usda.govlocdlncel
tschools.htm> (visited Mar 25,2002) (noting that the Cankdeska Cikana (Little Hoop) Commu-
nity College serves several tribes, including the Dakota, Lakota, and Spirit Lake Sioux).
82 See note 49.
83 See id. See also Montana v United States, 450 US 544,564 (1981) (noting that the "exer-
cise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control in-
ternal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes").
The University of Chicago Law Review
An analogous case from the employment context provides valu-
able insight into the limits imposed on sovereignty when the civil
rights of nontribal members are at issue. In Dawavendewa v Salt River
Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District,' a Hopi tribe
member alleged that a private employer on the Navajo reservation
did not consider him for a position.'5 He contended that the em-
ployer's conduct constituted unlawful employment discrimination by
discriminating against him on the basis of national origin.M Although
Title VII expressly exempts any business or enterprise on or near an
Indian reservation from liability under the statute for giving preferen-
tial treatment to an Indian,8 the court determined that the exemption
did not cover preferences on the basis of tribal affiliation.8 The court
reasoned that the statute exempts the hiring of Indians from the force
of its provisions "in order to compensate for the effects of past and
present unjust treatment, not in order to authorize another form of
discrimination against particular groups of Indians."''
The court's decision in Dawavendewa acknowledges that tribes
may engage in discriminatory practices, but they may do so only when
such practices favor tribal sovereignty and further general Indian in-
terests. According to the court, intertribal discrimination does not fur-
ther Indian interests. The Dawavendewa decision is significant in that
the court refused to defer to tribal practices that resulted in discrimi-
nation against members of another tribe.' The decision indicates that
a tribe's ability to determine its own affairs will be respected as an ex-
ercise of self-determination only when that decision exclusively im-
pacts members from the tribe itself.
In addition to its impact on nontribal members, there are other
reasons for the rationale that tribal education does not fall within the
"purely intramural" exclusion. Perhaps the most important reason is
that the education of tribal members affects federal law designed to
safeguard important federal interests.9' Those interests include the
84 154 F3d 1117 (9th Cir 1998).
85 Idat 1118.
86 Id.
87 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241,257, codified at 42 USC § 2000e
(1994).
88 Dawavendewa, 154 F3d at 1121.
89 Id at 1121-22.
90 See id at 1122 ("It seems evident that, under the exemption, favored treatment could not
be given to Indian males at the expense of Indian women, or to Indians of mixed blood in dero-
gation of the rights of those who are entirely of Indian ancestry.").
91 See Funmaker, 10 F3d at 1332 (recognizing that, although permitting federal court juris-
diction would impede on the tribe's rights to self-governance, "[t]he decision-making power of
Indian tribes ends, however, at the point when those decisions would violate federal law de-
signed to safeguard important federal interests such as the free flow of interstate commerce").
Compare Nevada v Hicks, 533 US 353, 409-10 (2001) ("When, however, state interests outside
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protection of citizens' civil rightsn as well as preserving the control of
federal funds given to the school systems. Moreover, the United
States has undertaken a legal obligation, through treaties and statutes,
to provide services to the Indian tribes.' If the United States allowed
tribal schools to provide services on an unequal basis to men and
women, the national government would, in effect, fail to fulfill its
commitment to provide the same services to Indians as it provides to
all other children-namely the opportunity for each child, male or fe-
male, to obtain an education on an equivalent basis.9
This concern with federal interests leads directly to consideration
of the second prong of the Farris test.
2. Applying Farris to tribal schools: does application of
Title IX abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties?
In Farris, the Ninth Circuit proposed an exception to the pre-
sumption that general laws apply to Indians when application of a
statute would affect Indian or tribal rights recognized by treaty or
statute.9 However, the application of Title IX to Indian tribes does not
abrogate tribes' rights recognized by treaties or other statutes. On the
contrary, the application of Title IX would further the rights guaran-
the reservation are implicated, States may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal
land."). See also Part ll.C.1.
92 Indians are both members of their respective tribes and American citizens. See Indian
Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub L No 68-175, 43 Stat 238, 253, 18 USC § 1401(b) (1994) (granting
US. citizenship to American Indians born within the territorial limits of the U.S. and also stating
that Indians are members of their respective tribes, thereby recognizing that Indians have dual
citizenship). Thus, the United States has an interest in protecting Indians as American citizens,
and quite apart from their status as members of Indian tribes. See generally Part II.C.1.
93 See Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677,704 (1979) (explaining that Congress
enacted Title IX in order to accomplish two distinct purposes: "First, Congress wanted to avoid
the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices; second, it wanted to provide in-
dividual citizens effective protection against those practices.').
94 See, for example, 20 USC § 7401 (1994), describing the educational policy of the United
States with respect to Indian tribes:
It is the policy of the United States to fulfill the Federal Government's unique and continu-
ing trust relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people for the education of In-
dian children. The Federal Government will continue to work with local educational agen-
cies, Indian tribes and organizations, postsecondary institutions, and other entities toward
the goal of ensuring that programs that serve Indian children are of the highest quality.
See generally Deloria, Legislative Analysis (cited in note 1).
95 See First Nation's Commission on Civil Rights, Protecting the Civil Rights of American
Indians and Alaska Natives: Nondiscrimination Laws Enforced by the Civil Rights Division,
United States Department of Justice, available online at <http://jimwindwalker.tripod.coml
indianlawusa/id9.html> (visited Mar 25, 2002) (noting that the Department of Justice requires
that "American Indian children who live on an Indian reservation where the land is not taxed
have the right to the same educational opportunities that are offered to all other children who
live in the school district").
96 Id.
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teed by treaties." The United States has made many treaties with the
Indian tribes, guaranteeing a provision of educational services" and
basic protection for Indian rights. For example, a statute that protects
the civil rights of all people, including Indian tribal members, com-
ports with the government's promise in the Northwest Ordinance,"
which underscores the central role of the national government in pre-
serving and protecting Indian rights. Title IX may be viewed as merely
an extension of these previous promises,' " one that specifies exactly
how the government intends to provide services: that is, it will provide
such education on an equivalent basis to both men and women. Given
the United States's assumed obligations and the promises it made in
treaties such as the Northwest Ordinance, Title IX does not interfere
with treaty or statutory rights; and, in fact, a determination that Title
IX does not apply to Indian tribes would contravene the purposes and
intent of these treaties.
Having determined that the application of Title DC to tribal
schools does not pose problems under the first two prongs of the Far-
ris test, there remains only a consideration of the test's final prong: is
there an explicit legislative intent to exclude Indian tribes or tribal
entities? TM As discussed above, Title IX is silent as to Indian tribes and
tribal entities. Thus, this possible exception need not be discussed here.
The analysis of Title IX and Indian tribal schools does not end
with consideration of the Farris test. Whether an Indian tribe is subject
to a statute and whether the tribe may be sued for violating the statute
are two entirely different questions.'02 As outlined in Part II, even if
the statute is applicable to a tribe, the tribe is not subject to suit unless
the tribe waived its immunity or Congress expressly abrogated it.'3 It
is clear from an examination of the language of the statute that Con-
gress did not expressly abrogate tribes' immunity-Title IX does not
even discuss Indian tribes. Thus, to determine whether the tribe is
97 See generally Deloria, Legislative Analysis (cited in note 1).
98 See id at 39-71 (describing the United States's treaty obligations for the education for
Indians).
99 See Northwest Ordinance, ch 8, Art III, 1 Stat 50 (1789) ("[Blut laws founded in justice
and humanity shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs done to [the Indians]!').
100 Consider Testimony of William Kindle, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe, before the Sen-
ate Committee on Indian Affairs 9 (2001), available online at <http://indian.senate.gov/2001hrgs/
plains062601/kinde.PDF> (visited Mar 25, 2002) (arguing that the federal government has an
obligation under treaty to provide not just education but also safe educational facilities to mem-
bers of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe).
101 Farris, 624 F2d at 893.
102 Florida Paraplegic Association v Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 166 F3d 1126,
1130 (11th Cir 1999) (finding that tribal sovereign immunity protects Indian tribes from suit).
103 Kiowa Tribe v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc, 523 US 751,754 (1998) ("As a matter of
law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has
waived its immunity.").
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amenable to lawsuit in federal court alleging violations of Title IX, we
must turn to the question of the tribe's waiver of immunity.
B. Tribal Waiver of Immunity through Assurance Letters
When an educational institution accepts federal funds for educa-
tional purposes, it signs an assurance letter agreeing to abide by the
relevant statutes governing the use of federal funds."6 When a tribal
government signs such an agreement in order to receive funds for the
operation of a tribal school, that signature should constitute a waiver
of immunity to suit by private plaintiffs or the national government in
federal court.
There are only two cases, both from the Eighth Circuit, that ad-
dress whether an assurance letter constitutes a waiver of tribal sover-
eign immunity, and both held that it does not. Neither case explains
in a detailed way the reasons underlying its decision; each merely
states that the language of the letters did not constitute an explicit
waiver of authority and thus could not be construed as a waiver.
'
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit's definition of waiver is inconsistent with
that of other courts, whose interpretation of waiver in other contexts
is considerably broader.'6
Most of the courts that have read an implied waiver in tribal con-
tracts have done so because the contract's language was explicit
enough to give notice of suit in federal court,'6 or because there was
evidence of the tribes' intent to waive immunity by choice of forum or
similar clauses. 6 These interpretations are also buttressed by impor-
104 See 34 CFR § 106.4 (2000):
Every application for Federal financial assistance shall as condition of its approval contain
or be accompanied by an assurance from the applicant or recipient, satisfactory to the As-
sistant Secretary, that the education program or activity operated by the applicant or re-
cipient and to which this part applies will be operated in compliance with this part.
105 See Hagen v Sisseton-Wahpeton Community College, 205 F3d 1040, 1044 n 2 (8th Cir
2000) ("Nor did the College waive its immunity by executing a certificate of assurance with
[Housing and Human Services] in which it agreed to abide by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964."); Dillon v Yankton Sioux Tribe Housing Authority, 144 F3d 581, 583-84 & n 2 (8th Cir
1998) (noting that tribe did not waive its immunity by signing a nondiscrimination assurance at-
tached to a HUD contract).
106 See Hagen,205 F3d at 1044 n 2; Dillon, 144 F3d at 583-84 & n 2.
107 See notes 106-110. See also Sokaogon Gaming Enterprise Corp v Tushie-Montgomery
Associates, nc, 86 F3d 656,659-60 (7th Cir 1996) (noting that no case has ever refused to find a
waiver of tribal immunity on the grounds that the waiver does not explicitly reference the tribe's
sovereign immunity).
103 See, for example, id at 660 (holding that where the Indian tribe agreed to arbitrate con-
tractual disputes in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, it had
waived its immunity from suit; even though "[t]here was no explicit mention of court actions[,]
the rules themselves provide for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards").
109 See, for example, C & L Enterprises v Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 532 US 411,422
(2001) (holding that a contract contained a waiver of sufficient clarity where the tribe "proposed
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tant policy considerations no and the same rationales underlying courts'
decisions to imply waiver also militate in favor of a different interpre-
tation of the funding contracts than that accorded by the Eighth Cir-
cuit.
For example, courts have reasoned that the language of the as-
surance letters - mandating that the signatories "shall comply" - gives
notice of suit because the practical implication of such mandatory lan-
guage is that the contracts provide a remedy for any breach. To hold
that tribes are not subject to suit even after agreeing to such condi-
tions would render the language of the contract void of its commonly
understood meaning. Instead of "must comply," the language would
effectively mean: "The tribe, as recipient of federal funds, will comply
if it wants to; but if it doesn't comply, there will be no penalty for its
actions in a federal or state court." By adhering to the latter interpre-
tation, courts in effect hold that a tribe may receive funds uncondi-
tionally, despite Congress's clear intent to condition the grant of funds
on the recipient's compliance with antidiscrimination statutes.
Important policy considerations also militate in favor of recogniz-
ing a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity through signed assurance
letters. First, the national government has consistently recognized,
through treaty and statute, a tribe's right to certain powers of self-
determination.'" To hold that the ability to waive immunity is not
among those powers would be contrary to that right.' 12 Second, non-
Indian interests might prudently avoid contracts with tribes that might
otherwise prove beneficial to the tribes, with the result that Indians
wishing to solicit funds or to engage in business would be impeded. 3
Finally, and most significantly, to claim that tribes may receive
funds only on the condition of signing a nondiscrimination assurance
letter and yet provide no meaningful way of enforcing that agree-
ment' would essentially turn a conditional agreement into an uncon-
and prepared" the relevant contract language).
110 See Heath Oberloh, Calvello v. Yankton Sioux Tribe: Shoring Up Tribal Sovereign Im-
munity against the Flood of Commercial Transactions Involving Tribally Owned Businesses, 44
SD L Rev 746, 746 (1999) (noting that "as tribes expand their commercial ventures" off-
reservation, sovereign immunity acts as a barrier to normal contractual resolution and "[d]ue to
the resulting inequity, courts have become more willing to limit the trumping power of sovereign
immunity").
111 See, for example, 25 USC § 450a (recognizing tribal sovereignty and encouraging tribal
self-determination).
112 See Bottomly v Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F2d 1061,1066 (1st Cir 1979). See also Bailey
v City of Knoxville, 113 F Supp 3,6 (E D Tenn 1953) ("Sovereign immunity means only that the
sovereign may not be sued without its consent. Implied in that immunity is the power to con-
sent.").
113 See United States v Oregon, 657 F2d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir 1981) (recognizing that Indian
tribes do have a right to waive sovereign immunity).
114 See Brake and Catlin, 3 Duke J Gender L & Pol at 58 n 62 (cited in note 21) (noting that
a private right of action is necessary to ensure that the goals of Title IX are met).
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ditional one. Congress enacted Title IX and, as argued above,"' in-
tended it to apply to Indian tribes in a meaningful way. Although
Congress has the power to enact a statute limiting the actions of tribes
without providing federal means of protecting those who need it,"6 it
has not done so in this case and courts should be critical of an inter-
pretation that concludes that Congress has provided an unconditional
grant of funds.'"
C. Other Limits on the Tribal Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
When analyzing the issues discussed in this Comment, two addi-
tional arguments should be noted. One concerns the strength of the
federal interest at stake, and the second involves what is termed the
federal trust doctrine.
1. Federal interest
Sometimes statutes of general application touch on matters that
Congress has already addressed-and in so addressing, has made clear
that the matters covered by the general statute are of profound na-
tional interest. In the civil rights context, Congress clearly manifested
an intent to ensure equality for all citizens in public institutions by
passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 The Civil Rights Act recognized
the federal civil rights of all citizens.'"9 Although it was enacted primar-
ily in response to racial discrimination, the Civil Rights Act also rec-
ognized the importance of protecting against discrimination on the
basis of "religion, sex or national origin."'2' Thus, the Civil Rights Act
may be read as a definitive assertion by Congress that it will not toler-
ate any discrimination against citizens on the basis of race, religion,
sex, or national origin. More specific statutes, such as Title IX, grow
from this general declaration and further the purposes underlying it.
Where such strong federal interests are at stake, the sovereign
immunity doctrine should be limited, regardless of any tribal interest
in self-governance.' 2' The Supreme Court has suggested-at least in
115 See Part III.A.
116 Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49, 65 (1978) (recognizing a cause of action in
tribal courts where sovereign immunity protects tribes from suit in federal courts).
117 Although alternative remedies are available because tribes are probably not immune
from suit by the United States, see Quileute Indian Tribe v Babbitt, 18 F3d 1456,1459-60 (9th Cir
1994) ("[T]ribal sovereignty does not extend to prevent the federal government from exercising
its superior sovereign powers."), this Comment does not seek to analyze all alternative remedies,
including the effectiveness of suit in tribal court, but is instead concerned with showing that suit
in federal court is a viable option.
1'8 Pub L No 88-352,78 Stat 253, codified at 42 USC § 2000e (1994).
119 See id.
120 Id.
121 See Washington v Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 US 134, 153
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cases involving non-Indians-that where the government holds a
strong interest in the issue or rights implicated, the normal presump-
tion of Indian law should be inverted. '2 In other words, if Congress has
plenary power to waive a tribe's immunity from suit, it should be as-
sumed-absent express congressional intent not to do so-that Con-
gress intended to waive the tribe's immunity when preserving that
immunity would conflict with or contravene those rights that Congress
has already indicated embody strong federal interests.
2. Federal trust doctrine
At least some courts have indicated that tribes lose their claims
to sovereignty by entering into a trust relationship with the federal
government.u Canons of construction important to the interpretation
of the tribal immunity doctrine arise from this trust relationship. 12 Be-
cause Congress is presumed to act in the tribes' best interest, courts
must read federal statutes as protecting Indian rights. '2 Thus, the exis-
tence of a federal trust relationship between Indians and the national
government aids us in understanding the applicability of education
laws to Indian tribes. Where the government has assumed responsibil-
ity for a sphere of activity, the doctrine of sovereign immunity should
not block the application of statutes passed in furtherance of the na-
tional government's assumed obligations.
CONCLUSION
Although a recognition of tribal sovereignty has been-and con-
tinues to be-an important federal policy, the national government
must also fulfill its historic obligations to make laws in "justice and
(1980) (noting that tribal sovereignty may be limited "where [its] ... exercise ... would be incon-
sistent with the overriding interests of the National Government"); Oliphant v Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 US 191,208-10 (1978) (stressing the shared assumptions of the executive, judicial, and
legislative departments that Indian tribes could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians because Indian tribal courts did not accord the full protections of the Bill of Rights).
122 See id.
123 See United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 326 (1978) (explaining that the Oliphant Court
could deprive tribes of jurisdiction over nonmembers because "the sovereign power of a tribe to
prosecute its members for tribal offenses clearly does not fall within that part of sovereignty
which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status"). See also United States v
Oregon, 657 F2d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir 1981) (noting that the trust relationship limits tribes' rights
to self-determination: tribes cannot waive their immunity by contract with regard to property
held in trust by the federal government without federal approval).
124 See Cohen, Handbook at 221-22 (cited in note 2) (discussing the nature of the federal
trust responsibility).
125 See id at 224. See also Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US 49 at 60-61 (noting that a central
purpose of enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act was to "protect individual Indians from arbitrary
and unjust actions of tribal governments").
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humanity"' and to prevent wrongs from being done to the tribes or to
their members. Where important federal interests are at stake-such
as the elimination of sex-based discrimination in schools-and the
government is acting in an area in which it has assumed legal obliga-
tions, the courts can, and must, assert jurisdiction over claims brought
against tribes acting in contravention to the expressed intent of Con-
gress.
Consistent with this policy and the current law, courts should in-
terpret Title IX to apply to Indian tribal schools. Furthermore, the
courts should interpret waiver in a way that recognizes the importance
of the federal interests at stake and the need for meaningful enforce-
ment of these interests. Thus, private plaintiffs should be allowed to
sue Indian tribes in federal court for violations of Title IX.
126 Northwest Ordinance, ch 8, Art 111, 1 Stat 50 (1789).
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